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Abstract
The dynamics of fake news and rumor spreading is investigated using a model with three kinds
of agents who are respectively the Seeds, the Agnostics and the Others. While Seeds are the ones
who start spreading the rumor being adamantly convinced of its truth, Agnostics reject any kind of
rumor and do not believe in conspiracy theories. In between, the Others constitute the main part
of the community. While Seeds are always Believers and Agnostics are always Indifferents, Others
can switch between being Believer and Indifferent depending on who they are discussing with. The
underlying driving dynamics is implemented via local updates of randomly formed groups of agents.
In each group, an Other turns into a Believer as soon as m or more Believers are present in the group.
However, since some Believers may lose interest in the rumor as time passes by, we add a flipping
fixed rate 0 < d < 1 from Believers into Indifferents. Rigorous analysis of the associated dynamics
reveals that switching from m = 1 to m ≥ 2 triggers a drastic qualitative change in the spreading
process. When m = 1 even a small group of Believers may manage to convince a large part of the
community very quickly. In contrast, for m ≥ 2, even a substantial fraction of Believers does not
prevent the rumor dying out after a few update rounds. Our results provide an explanation on why
a given rumor spreads within a social group and not in another, and also why some rumors will not
spread in neither groups.
Key Words: rumor spreading, bootstrap percolation, Galam model, threshold model.
1 Introduction
Last years have witnessed the emergence of the new phenomenon denoted “fake news”, which has become
a worldwide major concern for many actors of political life. In particular, the impact of fake news on
twisting democratic voting outcomes has been claimed repeatedly to explain unexpected voting outcomes
as Brexit and Trump victories. Fake news have been also identified during the 2017 presidential French
campaign.
Fake news has turned to an important form of social communications, and their spread plays a
significant role in a variety of human affairs. It can have a significant impact on people lives, distorting
scientific facts and establishment of conspiracy theories..
That has triggered the temptation in many countries to curb actual total and anonymous free speech
in Internet by setting up new regulations to hinder the political influence of fake news. However, up
to date no solid evidence has been found to demonstrate that fake news have indeed reverse a voting
outcome. It seems, that fake news are spreading among people having already made their political choice.
In any case, to fight against fake news phenomena using the implementation of new judicial regulations
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it is of importance to understand the mechanisms at work in their spreading. What eventually matters
is not the production of fake news but their capacity to spread quickly and massively. It is therefore
essential to understand the spreading dynamics.
However, before challenging that goal we claim that the novelty of fake news is not their nature and
content but the support of its spreading, namely Internet and social networks. Indeed, fake news are
identical to the old category of rumors, which were and still are spread through the process of word-
of-mouth. Fake news have created a qualitative change of scale with respect to rumors thank to the
new technologies, which have democratized the production and reproduction of information, increasing
drastically the rate at which misinformation can spread. Therefore, control and possible handling to
manipulate information are now major issues in social organizations including economy, politics, defense,
fashion, even personal affairs. The issue of fake news (rumors) spreading has become of a strategic
importance at all levels of society.
Accordingly, we feel that to reach the core of the phenomenon it is more feasible to focus on the
phenomenon of rumor spreading carried on by the word-of-mouth. We address the issue by building a
mathematical model along an already rich path of contributions from researchers with wide spectrum of
backgrounds, like political sciences, statistical physics, computer science, and mathematics.
In our proposed model, three kinds of agents are considered, the Seeds, the Agnostics and the Others.
The Seeds are the initial spreaders of the rumor. They are adamantly convinced the rumor is true and
no argument can make them renouncing to it. They trigger the spreading and keep on trying to convince
Others to believe in the rumor. The Others constitute the main body of the community. They are
either Believers, people who are convinced the rumor is true, or Indifferents, people who do not believe
the rumor is true. Indifferents can turn into Believers if given convincing counter arguments. On the
other hand, over time Believers might lose their belief and become Indifferents. The Agnostics are not
concerned about the rumor. In addition, they do not believe in any rumors and reject conspiracy theories
as a whole. They are always Indifferents to any rumor .
The dynamics is studied rigorously using local updates in groups formed randomly through informal
social gatherings occurring in offices, houses, bars, and restaurants at time break meetings like lunch,
happy hours and dinner. Outcomes of those local updates depend on the number m of actual Believers
in the group. A Seed contribute to the update as a Believer while an Agnostic acts as an Indifferent.
The faith of the spreading is found to depend drastically on the value of m in addition to the actual
proportions of Seeds and Agnostics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model. Section 3 reviews
prior models of rumors propagation with which our model shares some attributes. Finally, in Section 4
we provide our results by the rigorous analysis of the model.
2 The m-rumor spreading model
In m-rumor spreading model, we consider a community with N agents, which includes proportions of
respectively s of Seeds, bN of Agnostics, and thus (1−b)N−s Others. At each discrete-time round t ≥ 1,
agents gather randomly in fixed rooms of different sizes from 2 to a constant L ≥ 2, where the numbers
of seats in all rooms sum up to N , and then the agents update their opinion as follows:
• An Other who is Indifferent and is in a room with at least m (m ≥ 1) Believers becomes a Believer
• An Other, who is a Believer, becomes Indifferent independently with a probability 0 < d < 1.
• An Agnostic remains always an Indifferent.
• A Seed remains always a Believer.
Figure 1 illustrates one round of the process where a black/white square corresponds to a Seed/Agnostic
and a black/white circle corresponds to a Believer/Indifferent.
Assume that initially N0 individuals are Believers. We are interested in the sequence N1, N2, · · · ,
where the random variable Nt for t ≥ 1 is the number of Believers after round t.
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Figure 1: One round of the process for m = 2, N = 16, b = 0.25, and d = 0.1. Two Indifferents turn
Believers, but one Believer becomes Indifferent for d = 0.1.
2.1 Assumptions
The value of m is a function of different parameters, like the persuasiveness of the rumor or the tendency
of the community in believing that. We assume that m is a fixed positive integer. Recall that there
are s Seeds, who initiate the rumor. We assume that s is at least as large as m since m Believers are
needed to turn an Indifferent to a Believer. Furthermore, we always suppose that s is a constant while
let N tend to infinity. That is, Seeds are a very small group. Moreover, b is assumed to be a small
constant, say 0.25 which implies that 25% of the community are Agnostics. We also assume that d is a
fixed small constant, say 0.1, which means that a Believer loses interest in the rumor after 10 rounds in
expectation and becomes an Indifferent. In the present paper, our main focus is devoted to demonstrate
how switching from m = 1 to m ≥ 2 triggers a drastic qualitative change in the spreading process, which
consequently shed some light on the outcome of some real-world elections. Thus for our purpose, it is
realistic to assume that b ≤ 0.25 and d ≤ 0.1.1 However, it is definitely desirable to analyze the m-rumor
spreading model for larger values of d and b. We provide some intuition and analytic explanations in
Section 5, but the rigorous analysis of the process in this setting is left for future work.
For the sake of simplicity we suppose that all rooms are of size r for some constant r. However, our
results carry on the general setting with rooms of different sizes by applying basically the same proof
ideas.
Finally, we assume that r > m because otherwise no Indifferent could become a Believer. Note that
for an Indifferent to become a Believer, it must share a room with at least m Believers which is not
possible for r ≤ m.
2.2 Markov Chain
The m-rumor spreading model defines a Markov chain on state space S = {j : s ≤ j ≤ (1− b)n}, where
state j corresponds to having j Believers. (Note that we rule out states j < s and j > (1 − b)n since
there are s Seeds and bN Agnostics). Furthermore, the transition probability Pjj′ , for j, j′ ∈ S, is the
probability of having j′ Believers in the next round given there are j Believers in the current round.
Assume that we have j Believers for some s ≤ j < (1− b)N . With some non-zero probability, in the
next round at least one Indifferent becomes a Believer and all Believers remain unchanged. Thus, there
is a non-zero probability to reach state (1 − b)N from state j for any s ≤ j ≤ (1 − b)N . Furthermore,
since with some non-zero probability all Believers choose to become Indifferent in the next round, except
Seeds2, there is a non-zero probability to reach state s from state j for any s ≤ j ≤ (1− b)N . Therefore,
the process eventually reaches state s, where only Seeds believe in the rumor, or it reaches some state
j ≥ N/2, where at least half of the community believe in the rumor. We say the rumor dies out in the
first case and we say it takes over in the second one.
1We should mention that the values 0.25 and 0.1 are chosen to make our calculations more straightforward; otherwise,
our results hold also for larger values of b and d, say b ≤ 0.3 and d ≤ 0.2. However, this does not apply to any value of d
and b as we discuss in Section 5.
2This is trivial since Seeds remain Believers forever by definition. Thus, from now on we will avoid mentioning it.
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2.3 Our contribution
Having the m-rumor spreading model in hand, two natural questions arise: what are the conditions for
which a rumor takes over or dies out? and how fast does this happen? The main goal of the present
paper is to address these two basic questions.
First we consider the m-rumor spreading process for m = 1 and prove that if N0 ≥ s, then the rumor
takes over in O(logN) rounds asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.)3. This implies that if even initially
only Seeds, which are a group of constant size, believe in the rumor, for m = 1 the rumor takes over
in logarithmically many rounds. However, by switching from m = 1 to m ≥ 2 a very different picture
emerges. We prove that for m ≥ 2 the rumor dies out in O(logN) rounds a.a.s. if N0 ≤ αN for some
sufficiently small constant α > 0. This means if even initially a constant fraction of the community are
Believers, for m ≥ 2 the rumor dies out. Therefore, a drastic change occurs in the behavior of the process
by switching from m = 1 to m ≥ 2, i.e., the process exhibits a threshold behavior.
Let us illustrate this threshold behavior by a numerical example. Consider a community of size
N = 106 and assume that b = 0.25, d = 0.1, r = 3, and s = 100. Let f(n) denote the expected number
of Believers in the next round by assuming that there are n Believers in the current round (we will
provide an exact formula for f(n) in Section 4, Equation (2)). One can observe in Figure 2 (left) that
f(n) > n for s = 100 ≤ n ≤ 500, 000 = N/2. Therefore, by starting from 100 Believers, in each round
the number of Believers increases in expectation until there are N/2 Believers, i.e., the rumor takes over.
In Figure 2 (right), we present the expected percentage of Believers in the t-th round for 0 ≤ t ≤ 20 by
assuming that N0 = 100. It demonstrates that if initially only 0.01% of the community are Believers, the
expected percentage of Believers after 15 rounds is almost equal to 67.5%, which implies that we expect
the rumor to take over in less than 15 rounds. Note that the Believers can constitute at most 75% of
the community, but in that case 10% of them, which is 7.5% of the whole community, would turn into
Indifferent in expectation since d = 0.1. This may explain where the value 67.5% comes from.
Figure 2: (left) Variation of f(n) (right) the expected percentage of Believers in round t given N0 = 100.
Now, we consider the same setting but for m = 2. Figure 3 (left) illustrates that f(n) < n for
s = 100 ≤ n ≤ 100, 000 = N/10. We also provide the variation of function f(n)−n in Figure 3 (middle),
where it is easier to spot that f(n) < n. Thus, if initially even 10% of the community believe in the
rumor, we expect the number of Believers decreases in each round until only the 100 Seeds believe in the
rumor, i.e., it dies out. In Figure 3 (right), the expected percentage of Believers in the t-th round for
0 ≤ t ≤ 69 are drawn by assuming that N0 = 100, 000. This explains that if initially even 10% of the
community are Believers, the rumor still dies out in 69 rounds in expectation.
Let us briefly discuss the intuition behind such a change in the behavior ofm-rumor spreading process.
Assume that initially Believers constitute a small fraction of the community. In that case, it is a very
3We say an event happens asymptotically almost surely whenever it happens with probability 1 − o(1) while we let N
tend to infinity.
4
Figure 3: (left) Variation of f(n) (middle) variation of f(n)− n (right) the expected percentage of
Believers in round t given N0 = 100, 000.
unlikely that a room includes two or more Believers. Therefore, if m = 2, then almost no “new” Believer
is generated, i.e., no Indifferent become a Believer. Furthermore, each Believer becomes Indifferent with
probability d. Thus, we expect the number of Believers to decrease by a constant factor. On the other
hand, if m = 1, then all Believers who are in different rooms can single-handedly turn all the agents in
their room into Believers. Thus, the number of Believers increases by an r factor. (Actually, this is a
bit smaller since we did not take Agnostics into account.) Note that in this case also a d fraction of the
Believers become Indifferent in expectation, but this is negligible since we assume that d is in order of
0.1 but r ≥ 2. Therefore, the number of Believers increases by a constant factor, in expectation.
2.4 Proof techniques.
We analyze the model rigorously applying standard tools and techniques from probability theory. We
compute the formula for the expected number of Believers as a function of the model parameters and the
number of Believers in the previous round. This formula turns out to be quite involved. Thus, instead
we work with suitable upper and lower bounds, which are easier to handle. Building on these bounds,
we show that if m = 1, in expectation the number of Believers increases by a constant factor in each
round until the rumor takes over. To turn such an expectation based argument into an a.a.s. statement,
we exploit classical concentration inequalities, like the Chernoff bound and Azuma’s inequality. Since
the number of Believers increases by a constant factor in each round, the rumor takes over in O(logN)
rounds. We prove that this bounds is asymptotically tight; that is, for some cases a.a.s. the rumor needs
Ω(logN) rounds to take over. A similar argument holds for the case of m ≥ 2, where in each round the
number of Believers decreases by a constant factor until the rumor dies out.
2.5 Real cases ground
Within our model, for a given rumor, its success or failure in spreading depends merely on the value of
m. The value m = 1 drives viral the rumor while it fades quickly for m ≥ 2. The actual value of m is
expected to be a function of both the rumor content and the social characteristics of the community in
which it is launched. Therefore the same rumor may spread in a community and fade away in another.
And of two different rumors within a community, one may spread and the other vanishes.
In [7] those differences were given an explanation in terms of the existence of different prejudices and
cognitive biases, which were activated at ties in even discussing groups with otherwise a local majority
rule update. Here we provide another explanation for this phenomena, based on the value of m in the
discussing group, which does not obey a local majority rule for shifting opinions. It is worth to mention
that our current approach could in principle be extended to account for a mixture of arguments with
different convincing power leading to a combination of groups with m = 1 and m ≥ 2. The m = 1 case
embodies the promptness of an agent to believe in a given rumor or to the strength of the argument. The
same agent may requires m ≥ 2 to adopt another rumor as true either due to weaker arguments or the
content of the rumor.
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The fact that the actual value of m can vary from one social group to another with respect to the same
rumor can be illustrated using some recent real cases of differentiated rumor spreading. One significant
case relates to the terrorist attack in Strasbourg, France, on the eve of December 11, 2018. The terrorist,
a follower of Islamic State, claimed five person lives and wounded eleven persons, before being shot
by the police a few days latter. With the shooting occurring amid the uprising of the Yellow Jackets
(Gilets Jaunes) movement, a conspiracy theory emerged at once and spread quite quickly among a specific
community of French people, namely the ones identifying with the Yellow Jacket movement, claiming
the attack was set up by the French government to distract support to the on going social movement.
At the same time the rumor did not take over among the rest of the French population as shown by the
following poll figures. The statement? Evidences are not clear about who committed the attack or the
attack was a set up by French government? was found to be agreed on by 42% of yellow jacket activists
and 23% of yellow jacket supporters against only 11% within non supporters of yellow jackets.
A similar feature is exhibited with an American case about supposed Russian interference in last
American Presidential election. More specifically, attributing the hacking of Democratic e-mails to Russia
was supported by 87% of Clinton voters against only 20% of Trump voters.
3 Prior Work
As mentioned, the question of how a rumor spreads in a community has been studied extensively in
different contexts and numerous models have been introduced and investigated, both theoretically and
experimentally, see e.g. [3,15,17,18,20,21]. We shortly discuss some results regarding Galam model, DK
model, and bootstrap percolation model, which are arguably the closest ones to ours.
3.1 Bootstrap percolation model
Consider the relationship network between the people in a community and assume that initially each
agent is a Believer or an Indifferent toward a rumor. In m-bootstrap percolation, an Indifferent becomes
a Believer as soon as m of its connections in the network are Believers and remains a Believer forever.
The main question in this context is to determine the minimum number of agents who must be Believers
initially to guarantee that the rumor takes over the whole network eventually (that is, all agents become
Believers). This has been studied on different network structures, like hypercube [2], lattice [13], random
graphs [11, 16], and many others. In contrast to the bootstrap percolation model, which assumes that
the agents are sitting on the nodes of an underlying network, in our model agents gather in groups of
different sizes at random. In this sense, our model is more similar to Galam model, introduced in the
next section.
3.2 Galam model
The Galam model was introduced by Galam [6] to describe the spreading of a minority opinion resulting
in democratic rejection of social reforms initially favored by a majority. In this model, initially each
agent is positive or negative regarding a reform proposal. Then, in each discrete-time round they are
distributed randomly in groups of different sizes and everyone adopts the most frequent opinion in its
group; in case of a tie, negative opinion is chosen. Building on this model, Galam [6] provided some
illustrations regarding the output of some real-world elections. Later, several extensions of the model
were proposed and studied, for example by adding contrarian effect [8], introducing random tie-breaking
rule [9, 10], considering three competing opinions [12], and defining the level of activeness [19].
3.3 DK model
Another well-established rumor spreading model is DK model, introduced by Daley and Kendall [4].
There are essentially two differences between DK model and our model. Firstly in DK model, it is
assumed that the gatherings are always of size two. Furthermore, a Believer stops spreading the rumor
as soon as it encounters another Believer, in DK model. The illustration for such an updating rule is
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that the agent decides that it is no longer “news”, and thus stops spreading it. In that sense, our model is
perhaps more similar to the variant introduced by Zhao et al. [22], where a Believer becomes Indifferent
independently with some probability d > 0.
4 Rigorous demonstration of the m-rumor spreading
In this section we rigorously analyze the behavior of the m-rumor spreading model. The goal is to prove
Theorem 4.1 which is the main contribution of the present paper.
Theorem 4.1 In the m-rumor spreading model
(i) for m = 1 if N0 ≥ s, the rumor takes over
(ii) for m = 2 if N0 ≤ αN , the rumor dies out
asymptotically almost surely in O(logN) rounds, where α > 0 is a sufficiently small constant.
Theorem 4.1 states that by switching from m = 1 to m ≥ 2, the process behaves substantially
differently. For m = 1, the rumor takes over if even Others are all Indifferent initially. On the other
hand, for m = 2 the rumor dies out even though a constant fraction of the community believe in the
rumor already. They both occur in O(logN) rounds, which is shown to be asymptotically tight.
We first set up some basic definitions and state some standard concentration inequalities in Section 4.1.
Then, we provide the proof of Theorem 4.1 part (i) and part (ii) respectively in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.1 Preliminaries
Recall that random variable Nt for t ≥ 0 denotes the number of Believers at the end of round t. The
conditional random variable Nt|Nt−1 = n, called “Nt given Nt−1 = n”, has probability mass function
Pr[Nnt = n
′] = Pr[Nt = n′|Nt−1 = n], where we shortly write Nnt for Nt|Nt−1 = n. Furthermore, E[Nnt ]
denotes the expected value of random variable Nnt .
For m = 1, we show that E[Nnt ] > βn, for some constant β > 1, if s ≤ n ≤ N/2. Therefore, one
expects the rumor to take over in logarithmically many rounds. Furthermore for m = 2, E[Nnt ] < β′n,
for some constant β′ < 1, if s < n ≤ αN . Thus, by starting from αN Believers we expect the number of
Believers decreases by a constant factor in each round, i.e., the rumor dies out in a logarithmic number
of rounds. This should intuitively explain why Theorem 4.1 holds. However, to turn this expectation
based argument into a formal proof, we need to show that random variable Nnt is sharply concentrated
around its expectation and apply some careful calculations. In the rest of this section, we first compute
the value of E[Nnt ] and then provide some basic concentration inequalities, which are later used to prove
that Nnt is concentrated around E[Nnt ].
To calculate E[Nnt ], let us first determine the probability that an Indifferent agent I becomes a
Believer 4 in the t-th round given Nt−1 = n. We claim that this probability is equal to
N
r−1∑
j=m
(
n
j
)(
N − n− 1
r − j − 1
)
(r − 1)!(N − r)!/N !. (1)
There are N ! possibilities to assign N agents to N seats. Let us call each of these assignments a permuta-
tion. In Equation (1), the value N ! in the denominator stands for the number of all possible permutations
and the numerator is equal to the number of permutations for which agent I becomes a Believer. There
are N possibilities for fixing I’s seat, and the sum corresponds to the number of possibilities to assign the
remaining N − 1 agents such that there are at least m Believers in I’s room. For that, one can choose
exactly j Believers, for some m ≤ j ≤ r − 1, among n Believers to share the room with agent I, and the
4Whenever we talk about an Indifferent becoming a Believer, we clearly mean an Other who is an Indifferent; otherwise,
an Agnostic never becomes a Believer by definition.
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remaining seats in the room will be taken by r− j− 1 agents among the N −n− 1 Indifferents. After the
selection of the r− 1 agents who are in the same room with I, there are (r− 1)! possibilities of assigning
them to the seats and also (N −r)! possibilities to assign the other agents to the (N −r) remaining seats.
Each Believer remains a Believer independently with probability 1 − d if it is an Other and with
probability 1 if it is one of the s Seeds. Furthermore, each of the (1 − b)N − n Indifferents becomes a
Believer with the probability given in Equation (1) (while each of the bN Agnostics remains an Indifferent).
Therefore, we have
E[Nnt ] = s+ (n− s)(1− d) + ((1− b)N − n)
(r − 1)!∑r−1j=m (nj)(N−n−1r−j−1 )∏r−1
j=1(N − j)
. (2)
The above formula is a bit involved; thus, we sometimes will utilize relatively simpler formulas, which
are easier to handle, as lower and upper bounds in our proofs.
Let us recall three basic concentration inequalities which we will apply repeatedly later.
Theorem 4.2 (Markov’s inequality [5]) Let X be a non-negative random variable and a > 0, then
Pr[X ≥ a] ≤ E[X]
a
.
Theorem 4.3 (Chernoff bound [5]) Suppose x1, · · · , xk are independent Bernoulli random variables tak-
ing values in {0, 1} and let X denote their sum, then for 0 ≤  ≤ 1
Pr[(1 + )E[X] ≤ X] ≤ exp(−
2E[X]
3
)
and
Pr[X ≤ (1− )E[X]] ≤ exp(−
2E[X]
2
).
Theorem 4.4 (Azuma’s inequality [5]) Let x1, · · · , xk be an arbitrary set of random variables and let f
be a function satisfying the property that for each i ∈ [k] := {1, · · · , k}, there is a non-negative ci such
that
|E[f |xi, · · · , x1]− E[f |xi−1, · · · , x1]| ≤ ci.
Then, for constant  > 0
Pr[(1 + )E[f ] < f ] ≤ exp(−
2E[f ]2
2c
) = exp(−Θ(E[f ]
2
c
))
and
Pr[f < (1− )E[f ]] ≤ exp(−
2E[f ]2
2c
) = exp(−Θ(E[f ]
2
c
))
where c :=
∑k
i=1 c
2
i .
Note that although Markov’s inequality does not need any sort of independence, the Chernoff bound
requires X to be the sum of independent random variables. Azuma’a inequality also requires some level
of independence in the sense that to get a reasonable tail bound, the value of c has to be small.
We define the random variable Nnt as a function of N Bernoulli random variables and apply Azuma’s
inequality to attain Corollary 4.5.
Corollary 4.5 In the m-rumor spreading model, for any  > 0
Pr[(1 + )E[Nnt ] < Nnt ] ≤ exp(−Θ(
E[Nnt ]2
N
))
and
Pr[Nnt < (1− )E[Nnt ]] ≤ exp(−Θ(
E[Nnt ]2
N
)).
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Proof. We prove the first inequality, and the proof of the second one is analogous. Consider an arbitrary
labeling from 1 to N on the seats. We define Bernoulli random variable xni (t) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N to be 1 if
and only if the agent assigned to the i-th seat is a Believer given Nt−1 = n. Then, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N
|E[Nnt |xni (t), · · · , xn1 (t)]− E[Nnt |xni−1(t), · · · , xn1 (t)]| ≤ L′
where L′ is a constant as a function of L. Now by applying Theorem 4.4, we have
Pr[(1 + )E[Nnt ] < Nnt ] ≤ exp(−Θ(
E[Nnt ]2∑N
i=1 L
′2 )) = exp(−Θ(
E[Nnt ]2
N
)).

4.2 Proof of Part (i): m = 1
In this section, we prove that for m = 1 if N0 ≥ s, then the rumor takes over a.a.s. in O(logN) rounds.
We divide our analysis into three phases. We show that by starting with s Believers, the process reaches a
state with at least Ω(log log logN) Believers (phase 1), then it reaches a state with at least N2/3 Believers
(phase 2), and finally at least half of the community will become Believers (phase 3). Furthermore, each
of these three phases takes O(logN) rounds. As discussed, the main idea of the proof is to show that
the number of Believers increases by a constant factor in expectation in each round and then apply
the fact that Nnt is sharply concentrated around its expectation. However, there are two subtle issues
which make us to split our analysis into three phases. Firstly, the exact formula for E[Nnt ] is quite
involved, see Equation (2). Therefore, we sometimes have to work with relatively simpler lower/upper
bounds, which are technically easier to handle, but hold only for a particular range of n. Secondly, the
error probability provided by Corollary 4.5 is of form exp(−Θ(E[Nnt ]2N )), which is equal to a constant for
E[Nnt ] = O(
√
N). Therefore, for some settings we need to bound the error probability by applying other
techniques. Furthermore, we should mention that the values log log logN and N2/3 are selected in a way
to make the calculations straightforward, otherwise the proof works for some other values as well.
Phase 1. We prove that by starting from N0 ≥ s, there are at least logc log logN Believers after
O(logN) rounds a.a.s., where c > 1 is a constant to be determined later.5
Let us first provide Claim 4.6, whose proof is given below.
Claim 4.6 Assume that T = logr logc log logN and 1 ≤ n0 ≤ logc log logN , then for t′ ≥ 0,
Pr[Nt′+T ≥ rTn0|Nt′ = n0] ≥ 1√
logN
.
Claim 4.6 implies that from a state with n0 ≥ 1 Believers, after T rounds the process reaches a state with
at least rTn0 ≥ rT = logc log logN Believers with probability at least 1/
√
logN . The probability that the
process runs for T log2/3N rounds and never reaches logc log logN Believers or more is upper-bounded
by
(1− 1√
logN
)log
2/3N ≤ exp(− log1/6N) = o(1)
where we used 1− x ≤ exp(−x). Thus, for some t1 ≤ T log2/3N ≤ logN the process reaches at least
logc log logN Believers with probability 1− o(1).
5We assume that all logarithms are to base e, otherwise we point out explicitly.
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Proof of Claim 4.6. Let us first compute Pr[Nnt = rn], which is the probability that there are rn
Believers in the t-th round given Nt−1 = n, for some n ≤ bN . We define E1 to be the event that in
round t each Believer is assigned to a room with r − 1 Others who are all Indifferents given Nt−1 = n.
Furthermore, E2 is the event that no Believer becomes Indifferent in round t given Nt−1 = n. The number
of Believers will increase to rn in round t if and only if both events E1 and E2 occur. That is,
Pr[Nnt = rn] = Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] ≥ Pr[E1] · (1− d)n (3)
where we used that events E1 and E2 are independent and Pr[E2] = (1− d)n−s ≥ (1− d)n. We claim that
Pr[E1] =
(
N/r
n
)
n! rn
(
(1− b)N − n
(r − 1)n
)
((r − 1)n)!(N − rn)!/N !
where the value N ! in the denominator stands for the number of all possible permutations and the
numerator is equal to the number of permutations for which the event E1 occurs. The value
(
N/r
n
)
is the
number of possibilities of selecting the rooms which contain the Believers. Moreover, there are n! rn ways
of placing n Believers in these n rooms such that each of the rooms includes one Believer. We need to
choose (r − 1)n Indifferents among all (1 − b)N − n Others who are Indifferents to fill in the remaining
(r − 1)n seats in these rooms. There are ((r − 1)n)! possible assignments of the (r − 1)n chosen agents
into the (r − 1)n seats. Finally, there are (N − rn)! possibilities to place the remaining N − rn agents.
Now, we approximate this probability. Since
(
n
k
) ≥ (nk )k by Stirling’s approximation [14] and k! ≥
(k/e)k, we get
Pr[E1] ≥
( Nrn )
n (ne )
n rn ( (1−b)N−n(r−1)n) )
(r−1)n ( (r−1)ne )
(r−1)n∏rn−1
j=0 (N − j)
.
We have (1− b)N − n ≥ (1− 2b)N for n ≤ bN . Thus, by applying ∏rn−1j=0 (N − j) ≤ Nrn and b ≤ 0.25,
we get
Pr[E1] ≥ (1− 2b)
(r−1)n
exp(rn)
≥ exp(−2rn).
Combining this inequality and Equation (3) yields
Pr[Nnt = rn] ≥ exp(−2rn) · (1− d)n ≥ c−n (4)
for some constant c > 1 (which is the constant that we promised to determine later).
The probability Pr[Nt′+T ≥ rTn0|Nt′ = n0] is equal to
T∏
t=1
Pr[Nt′+t = r
tn0|Nt′+t−1 = rt−1n0] ≥
T∏
t=1
c−r
t−1n0 ≥ c−rTn0T
where we applied Equation (4). (To apply Equation (4) we need the inequality rt−1n0 ≤ bN to hold, which
is the case for t ≤ T = logr logc log logN and n0 ≤ logc log logN .) Now, by plugging in n0 ≤ logc log logN
and T = logr logc log logN implies that
Pr[Nt′+T = r
Tn0|Nt′ = n0] ≥ c−(logc log logN)3 ≥ 1√
logN
.
This finishes the proof of Claim 4.6. 
Phase 2. So far we proved that a.a.s. after t1 rounds, for some t1 ≤ logN , there are at least n1 =
logc log logN Believers. Now, we show that from a state with at least n1 Believers, a.a.s. the process
reaches a state with at least N2/3 Believers after O(logN) rounds. In this phase we always assume that
n1 ≤ n ≤ N 23 .
Let us define E3 to be the event that at least 320n Indifferents become Believers in round t given
Nt−1 = n. Furthermore, E4 is the event that at most 540n Believers become Indifferents in round t given
Nt−1 = n. We first provide lower bounds on the probabilities Pr[E3] and Pr[E4], respectively in Claim 4.7
and Claim 4.8.
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Claim 4.7 Pr[E3] ≥ 1− exp(−Θ(N)).
Proof. Assume that there are n Believers. Let R1 be the set of permutations where at least 120n Believers
share their room with at least another Believer. Furthermore, define R2 to be the set of permutations
where there are at least 810n Believers who share their room with (r − 1) Agnostics. We claim that
Pr[E3] ≥ 1− |R1|+ |R2|
N !
. (5)
This is true because if a permutation is not in R1 ∪ R2, then there are at least n − ( 120n + 810n) = 320n
Believers who share their room with no Believer but at least one Other who is Indifferent. Therefore,
each of these 320n Believers single-handedly turns an Indifferent into a Believer. That is, at least
3
20n
Indifferents become Believers.
There are
(
n
n/20
)
possibilities to choose 120n Believers. We have
(
N/r
n/40
)
possibilities for the selection of
1
40n rooms. Furthermore, (
rn
40 )
n
20 is an upper bound on the number of placements of these 120n Believers
in the rn40 seats in the selected rooms. Finally, there are (N − n20 )! possibilities to place the remaining
agents. Clearly, in this way we count each permutation which is in R1 at least once. Therefore, we have
|R1|
N !
≤
(
n
n/20
)(
N/r
n/40
)
( rn40 )
n
20 (N − n20 )!
N !
.
By applying
(
n
k
) ≤ (nek )k, Stirling’s approximation [14], we get
|R1|
N !
≤ (20e)
n
20 ( 40eNrn )
n
40 ( rn40 )
n
20∏ n
20−1
j=0 (N − j)
≤ (20e)
n
20 ( 40eNrn )
n
40 ( rn40 )
n
20
( 1920N)
n
20
.
In the last step we used the fact that N − j ≥ 1920N for 0 ≤ j ≤ n20 − 1. By some simplifications we get
|R1|
N !
≤ ( (20e)
2 × e× r × 202
40× 192 )
n
40 (
n
N
)
n
40 ≤ exp(−Θ(n)) (6)
where we used that nN = o(1) for n ≤ N
2
3 .
To bound |R2|, we select 8n10 Believers, 8(r−1)n10 Agnostics, and 8n10 rooms. This can be done in(
n
8n/10
)(
bN
8(r−1)n/10
)(
N/r
8n/10
)
different ways. There are ( 8n10 )! r
8n
10 possibilities to place the Believers in these
rooms such that each of the rooms has exactly one Believer. Finally, there are ( 8(r−1)n10 )! possibilities to
place the Agnostics in the remaining 8(r−1)n10 seats in these rooms and (N − 8rn10 )! possibilities to place
the remaining agents. In this way, we count a permutation in R2 at least once. Therefore, we have
|R2|
N !
≤
(
n
8n/10
)(
bN
8(r−1)n/10
)(
N/r
8n/10
)
( 8n10 )!r
8n
10 ( 8(r−1)n10 )!(N − 8rn10 )!
N !
.
Note that N − j ≥ 1920N for 0 ≤ j ≤ 8rn10 − 1 and n ≤ N
2
3 . This implies that
(N − 8rn10 )!
N !
=
1∏ 8rn
10 −1
j=0 N − j
≤ 1
( 1920N)
8rn
10
.
By applying this inequality and
(
n
k
) ≤ (nek )k and n! ≤ e√n(ne )n, Stirling’s approximation [14], we get
|R2|
N !
≤
( 10e8 )
8n
10 ( (10e)(bN)8(r−1)n )
8(r−1)n
10 ( 10eN8rn )
8n
10 e
√
8n
10 (
8n
10e )
8n
10 r
8n
10 e
√
8(r−1)n
10 (
8(r−1)n
10e )
8(r−1)n
10
( 1920N)
8rn
10
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By some simplifications, we have
|R2|
N !
≤ (10e
8
br−1(
20
19
)r)
8n
10 e2
√
82(r − 1)n2
102
= exp(−Θ(n)). (7)
In the last step, we used that 10e8 b
r−1( 2019 )
r is a constant strictly smaller than 1. This is true because b is
a small constant, say b ≤ 0.25 (see Section 2.1).
To finish the proof, combining Equations (5), (6), and (7) yields
Pr[E3] ≥ 1− exp(Θ(n))

Claim 4.8 Pr[E4] ≥ 1− exp(−Θ(N)).
Proof. Define random variable Xnt to be the number of Believers who become Indifferent in round t
given Nt−1 = n. Consider an arbitrary labeling from 1 to n on the Believers and define Bernoulli random
variable xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n to be 1 if and only if the i-th Believer becomes Indifferent. Recall that each
Believer becomes an Indifferent with probability d independently in round t, except Seeds who remain
Believers. Thus, Pr[xi = 1] ≤ d. Clearly, Xnt =
∑n
i=1 xi and E[Xnt ] = (n− s)d ≤ nd. Note that xis are
independent; thus, by applying Chernoff bound (see Theorem 4.3) we get
Pr[Xnt ≥
5
40
n] ≤ Pr[Xnt ≥ (1 + )dn] ≤ Pr[Xtn ≥ (1 + )E[Xnt ]] ≤
exp(−
2E[Xnt ]
3
) = exp(−Θ(n))
where we choose the constant  > 0 sufficiently small to satisfy (1 + )d ≤ 540 . This is doable since we
assume that d ≤ 0.1, see Section 2.1. Therefore,
Pr[E4] = Pr[Xnt <
5
40
n] = 1− Pr[Xnt ≥
5
40
n] = 1− exp(−Θ(n)).

If both events E3 and E4 occur, then the number of Believers will increase from n to at least n+ 320n−
5
40n = (1 +
1
40 )n. Since E3 and E4 are independent, by applying Claims 4.7 and 4.8 we get
Pr[Nnt ≥
41
40
n] ≥ Pr[E3 ∩ E4] = Pr[E3] · Pr[E4] = 1− exp(−Θ(n)) ≥ 1− c−n1 (8)
for some constant c1 > 1.
Equation (8) states that in each round the number of Believers increases by a constant fraction with
a probability converging to one. Building on this statement and applying the union bound, we show that
a.a.s. in logarithmically many rounds the number of Believers overpasses N
2
3 .
Recall that in phase 1 we proved that there is some t1 ≤ logN so that Nt1 ≥ n1 a.a.s. for n1 =
logc log logN .
Claim 4.9 Assume that ( 4140 )
t−1n1 < N
2
3 for some positive integer t. Then, given Nt1 ≥ n1, we have
Nt1+t ≥ ( 4140 )tn1 with probability at least 1−
∑t−1
t′=0 c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 .
Proof. Let us define the events
At := {Nt ≥ (41
40
)tn1} t ≥ 0
A′t := {Nt = (
41
40
)tn1} t ≥ 0.
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By definition, for 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t we have Pr[At|A′t′ ] ≤ Pr[At|At′ ]. We apply this inequality several times
later.
The goal is to prove that for t ≥ 1
Pr[At|A0] ≥ 1−
t−1∑
t′=0
c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 .
We apply proof by induction. As the base case, for t = 1 we have
Pr[A1|A0] ≥ Pr[A1|A′0]
Eq. (8)
≥ 1− c−n11 .
As the induction hypothesis (I.H.), assume that Pr[At−1|A0] ≥ 1−
∑t−2
t′=0 c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 . Now, we have
Pr[At|A0] ≥ Pr[At|A0 ∩At−1] · Pr[At−1|A0] ≥ Pr[At|At−1] · Pr[At−1|A0] ≥
Pr[At|A′t−1] · Pr[At−1|A0]
Eq. (8)
≥ (1− c−( 4140 )
t−1n1
1 ) · Pr[At−1|A0]
I.H.≥
(1− c−( 4140 )
t−1n1
1 )(1−
t−2∑
t′=0
c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 ) ≥ 1−
t−1∑
t′=0
c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 .
We need the assumption of ( 4140 )
t−1n1 < N
2
3 to apply Equation (8). 
We have that ( 4140 )
tn1 ≥ N 23 for t = log 41
40
N which implies that there exists some t2 = O(logN) such
that ( 4140 )
t2n1 ≥ N 23 and ( 4140 )t2−1n1 < N
2
3 . Therefore by applying Claim 4.9, given Nt1 ≥ n1, we have
Nt1+t2 ≥ N
2
3 with probability at least
1−
t2−1∑
t′=0
c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 .
To bound this probability, let t′′ = log 41
40
logc1 logN . Then,
t2−1∑
t′=0
c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 ≤
t′′−1∑
t′=0
c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 +
t2−1∑
t′=t′′
c
−( 4140 )t
′
n1
1 ≤ t′′c−n11 + t2c−(
41
40 )
t′′n1
1 .
Since t2 = O(logN) and n1 = logc log logN , this is upper-bounded by
O(log log logN)c− logc log logN1 +O(logN)(logN)− logc log logN = o(1) + o(1) = o(1).
Hence, given Nt1 ≥ n1, we have Nt1+t2 ≥ N
2
3 for some t2 = O(logN) with probability 1− o(1).
Overall by phases 1 and 2, starting from s Believers, a.a.s. the process reaches at least N
2
3 Believers
in a logarithmic number of rounds.
Phase 3. So far we showed that after t1+ t2 = O(logN) rounds a.a.s. there are at least N2/3 Believers.
Now, we prove that from a state with at least N2/3 Believers, more than half of the community will
become Believers (i.e., the rumor takes over) in logarithmically many rounds. We assume that n ≤ N/2
in this phase.
Let us first lower-bound the value of E[Nnt ] in this setting. By Equation (2), we have
E[Nnt ] ≥ (1− d)n+ ((1− b)N − n)
(r − 1)!∑r−1j=1 (nj)(N−n−1r−j−1 )∏r−1
j=1(N − j)
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To simplify this bound, we compute
(r − 1)!∑r−1j=1 (nj)(N−n−1r−j−1 )∏r−1
j=1(N − j)
=
(r − 1)!((N−1r−1 )− (N−n−1r−1 ))∏r−1
j=1(N − j)
=
(r − 1)!
∏r−1
j=1 (N−j)
(r−1)!∏r−1
j=1(N − j)
−
(r − 1)!
∏r−1
j=1 (N−n−j)
(r−1)!∏r−1
j=1(N − j)
= 1−
r−1∏
j=1
N − n− j
N − j ≥
1− N − n− 1
N − 1 ≥ 1−
N − n
N
=
n
N
.
Therefore,
E[Nnt ] ≥ (1− d)n+ ((1− b)N − n)
n
N
= (2− d− b− n
N
)n ≥ (3
2
− d− b)n
where we applied n ≤ N/2 in the last step. Recall that we always assume that d and b are small constants,
say d ≤ 0.1 and b ≤ 0.25. (See Section 2.1) Thus,
E[Nnt ] ≥ (1 + δ)n
for some small constant δ > 0. This implies that in expectation the number of Believers is multiplied by
1 + δ in each round. Thus, we expect the rumor to take over in a logarithmic number of rounds. In the
following, we prove that this expected behavior occurs a.a.s.
By applying the second part of Corollary 4.5 for  = δ/4 and using (1− δ4 )(1 + δ) ≥ (1 + δ2 ), we have
Pr[Nnt ≤ (1 +
δ
2
)n] ≤ Pr[Nnt ≤ (1−
δ
4
)(1 + δ)n] ≤ Pr[Nnt ≤ (1−
δ
4
)E[Nnt ]] ≤
exp(−Θ(E[N
n
t ]
2
N
)) ≤ exp(−Θ(((1 + δ)n)
2
N
)) = exp(−Θ(n
2
N
)).
Thus, there exists some constant c2 > 1 such that
Pr[Nnt ≥ (1 +
δ
2
)n] ≥ 1− c−n
2
N
2 . (9)
Equation (9) states that given Nt−1 = n, for some n = ω(
√
N), we have a.a.s. Nt ≥ (1 + δ2 )n. Using
this statement and the union bound we prove that a.a.s. after a logarithmic number of round the rumor
takes over.
Claim 4.10 Assume that (1 + δ2 )
t−1N
2
3 < N2 for some positive integer t. Then, given Nt1+t2 ≥ N
2
3 , we
have Nt1+t2+t ≥ (1 + δ2 )tN
2
3 with probability at least 1−∑t−1t′=0 c−(1+ δ2 )2t′N 132 .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Claim 4.9 by defining the events At and A′t respectively to
be {Nt ≥ (1+ δ2 )tN
2
3 } and {Nt = (1+ δ2 )tN
2
3 }. Furthermore, we use Equation (9) instead of Equation (8).
Note that we need the condition (1 + δ2 )
t−1N
2
3 < N2 to apply Equation (9). 
Since (1 + δ2 )
tN
2
3 ≥ N2 for t = log1+ δ2 N , there exists some t3 = O(logN) such that (1 +
δ
2 )
t3N
2
3 ≥ N2
and (1+ δ2 )
t3−1N
2
3 < N2 . Thus by applying Claim 4.10, given Nt1+t2 ≥ N
2
3 , we have Nt1+t2+t3 ≥ N2 with
probability at least
1−
t3−1∑
t′=0
c
−(1+ δ2 )2t
′
N
1
3
2 ≥ 1− t3 exp(−Θ(N
1
3 )) ≥ 1−O(logN) exp(−Θ(N 13 ))
which is equal to 1− o(1). Thus, given Nt1+t2 ≥ N
2
3 a.a.s Nt1+t2+t3 ≥ N2 for some t3 = O(logN).
Overall, combining phases 1, 2, and 3 implies that by starting from s Believers the rumor takes over
a.a.s. in O(logN) rounds.
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Remark 4.11 The error probability in Equation (9) is of the form exp(−Θ(n2N )), which is bounded by
a constant for n = O(√N). This should explain why in phases 1 and 2, where n ≤ N 23 , we applied a
different approach. However, our argument works for any choice of N
1
2+
′
for small ′ > 0 instead of
N
2
3 .
Tightness. We claim that the upper bound of O(logN) is tight. Note that starting with s Believers,
the number of Believers is multiplied by at most an r factor in each round. Thus, it takes the rumor at
least logr
N
2s = Ω(logN) to take over.
4.3 Proof of Part (ii): m ≥ 2
In this section, we analyze the m-rumor spreading model for m ≥ 2. We prove that if even initially
Believers constitute a constant fraction of the community (i.e., N0 = αN for some small constant α > 0),
the rumor dies out a.a.s. in O(logN) rounds. We divide our analysis into two phases. In phase 1, we
show that starting from αN Believers, the process reaches a state with less than F (N, d) := log 1
d
log logN
Believers a.a.s. in O(logN) rounds. Then in phase 2, we prove that from a state with at most F (N, d)
Believers, all agents will become Indifferents, except Seeds, a.a.s. in logarithmically many rounds. We
should mention that value of F (N, d) has been chosen to make the calculations straightforward.
Phase 1. We show that from a state with at most αN Believers, the process reaches at most F (N, d)
Believers in logarithmically many rounds a.a.s. In this phase we always assume that F (N, d) ≤ n ≤ αN .
The main idea is to show that in this setting in each round at most 14dn Indifferents become Believers
and at least 34dn Believers become Indifferents. Thus, the number of Believers decreases by a constant
factor in each round. To make this argument more formal, let us define E1 to be the event that at most
1
4dn agents switch from Indifferent to Believer in round t given that Nt−1 = n. Furthermore, let E2 be the
event that the number of Believers who become Indifferents is at least 34dn in round t given Nt−1 = n.
We first bound the probabilities Pr[E1] and Pr[E2] respectively in Claim 4.12 and Claim 4.13. Building
on them, we provide a lower bound on the probability Pr[Nnt ≥ (1− d2 )n].
Claim 4.12 Pr[E1] ≥ 1− exp(−Θ(n)).
Proof. We claim that
Pr[E1] ≤
( N
r
dn
4r
) (
n
dn
2r
) ( dn2r )!
2
dn
4r
(r(r − 1)) dn4r (N − dn2r )!
N !
where E1 is the complement of event E1. The numerator is an upper bound on the number of permutations
which result in the generation of at least 14dn new Believers (Indifferents who become Believers) out of
all possible N ! permutations. Note that in such permutations, there must exist dn4r rooms such that each
of them contains at least two Believers, otherwise less than 14dn Indifferents become Believers for m ≥ 2.
There are
( N
r
dn
4r
)
possibilities to select dn4r rooms and
(
n
dn
2r
)
ways to choose dn2r Believers. We claim that the
number of possibilities to assign to each of these rooms exactly two of the Believers is equal to (dn2r )!/2
dn
4r .
This is true because the number of choices to pair dn4r agents is
( dn2r )!
( dn4r )! 2
dn
4r
(see e.g. [1]) and there are (dn4r )!
ways of distributing these pairs into the rooms; thus, the number of all possibilities is equal to
(dn2r )!
(dn4r )! 2
dn
4r
(
dn
4r
)! =
(dn2r )!
2
dn
4r
.
Finally, there are r(r−1) possible placements for two Believers in a room of size r and there are (N− dn2r )!
possible placements for the remaining agents. In this way, we clearly count all our desired permutations
at least once (we are actually over-counting, but this is fine since we need an upper bound).
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By
(
n
k
) ≤ (nek )k, Stirling’s approximation [14], we get
Pr[E1] ≤
( 4eNdn )
dn
4r ( 2erd )
dn
2r (dn2r )
dn
2r r
dn
2r
2
dn
4r
∏ dn
2r −1
j=0 (N − j)
≤ (
2eN
dn )
dn
4r e
dn
2r n
dn
2r r
dn
2r
( 910N)
dn
2r
=
(
2e3r2102
92d
)
dn
4r (
n
N
)
dn
4r ≤ (2e
3r2102
92d
)
dn
4r α
dn
4r = exp(−Θ(n)).
where we used n/N ≤ α. Furthermore, we applied twice that α is a sufficiently small constant. Firstly, we
have (N−j) ≥ 910N for 0 ≤ j ≤ dn2r−1 by utilizing dn2r−1 ≤ 110N , which is true for α ≤ 2r10d = r5d . Secondly,
we applied α < 9
2d
2e3r2102 in the last step. Thus, we need constant α to be smaller than min(
r
5d ,
92d
2e3r2102 ),
which holds since we assume α to be a sufficiently small constant. 
Claim 4.13 Pr[E2] ≥ 1− exp(−Θ(n)).
Proof. Define random variable Xnt to be the number of Believers who switch into Indifferents in round
t given Nt−1 = n. Recall that each Believer becomes Indifferent with probability d independently, except
Seeds. Consider an arbitrary labeling from 1 to n on the Believers and define Bernoulli random variable
xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n to be 1 if and only if the i-th Believer becomes Indifferent. We know that Pr[xi = 1]
is equal to d if the i-the agent is Other and 0 if it is a Seed. Clearly, Xnt =
∑n
i=1 xi, which implies that
E[Xnt ] = (n− s)d. Thus, 910dn ≤ E[Xtn] by using sd ≤ 110n, which is true since s is a small constant and
n ≥ F (N, d) = log 1
d
log logN . Notice that xis are independent; thus, by applying Chernoff bound (see
Theorem 4.3) we have
Pr[E2] = Pr[ 3
4
dn ≤ Xnt ] = Pr[(1−
1
6
)
9
10
dn ≤ Xnt ] ≥ Pr[(1−
1
6
)E[Xnt ] ≤ Xnt ] =
1− Pr[Xnt < (1−
1
6
)E[Xnt ]] ≥ 1− exp(−
( 16 )
2E[Xnt ]
2
) ≥ 1− exp(− (
1
6 )
2 9
10dn
2
)
which is equal to 1− exp(−Θ(n)). 
If both events E1 and E2 occur, at most 14dn Indifferents become Believers and at least 34dn Believers
become Indifferents, which implies that the number of Believers decreases from n to (1 − d2 )n. Since,
events E1 and E2 are independent, applying Claims 4.12 and 4.13 yields
Pr[Nnt ≤ (1−
d
2
)n] ≥ Pr[E1 ∩ E2] = Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] ≥
(1− exp(−Θ(n))) (1− exp(−Θ(n))) = 1− exp(−Θ(n)).
Therefore, there exists some constant c > 1 such that for F (N, d) ≤ n ≤ αn, we have
Pr[Nnt ≤ (1−
d
2
)n] ≥ 1− c−n. (10)
This implies that if in round t−1 there are n Believers a.a.s. in the t-th round there are at most (1− d2 )n
Believers. Building on this statement and applying the union bound, we prove that from N0 ≤ αN , the
number of Believers decreases to F (N, d) a.a.s. in O(logN) rounds. To make this argument more formal
let us provide Claim 4.14.
Claim 4.14 Assume that (1− d2 )t−1αN ≥ F (N, d) for some positive integer t. Then,
Pr[Nt ≤ (1− d
2
)tαN |N0 ≤ αN ] ≥ 1−
t−1∑
t′=0
c−(1−
d
2 )
t′αN .
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Proof. We apply an inductive argument similar to the one in the proof of Claim 4.9. Let us define the
events
At := {Nt ≤ (1− d
2
)tαN} t ≥ 0
A′t := {Nt = (1−
d
2
)tαN} t ≥ 0.
Note that by definition, for 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t we have Pr[At|A′t′ ] ≤ Pr[At|At′ ], which we are going to utilize
several times later.
Our goal is to prove that for t ≥ 1
Pr[At|A0] ≥ 1−
t−1∑
t′=0
c−(1−
d
2 )
t′αN .
Now, we do induction on t. As the base case, for t = 1
Pr[A1|A0] ≥ Pr[A1|A′0]
Eq. (10)
≥ 1− c−αN .
As the induction hypothesis (I.H.), assume that Pr[At−1|A0] ≥ 1−
∑t−2
t′=0 c
−(1− d2 )t
′
αN . Now, we have
Pr[At|A0] ≥ Pr[At|A0 ∩At−1] · Pr[At−1|A0] ≥ Pr[At|At−1] · Pr[At−1|A0] ≥
Pr[At|A′t−1] · Pr[At−1|A0]
Eq. (10)
≥ (1− c−(1− d2 )t−1αN ) · Pr[At−1|A0]
I.H.≥
(1− c−(1− d2 )t−1αN )(1−
t−2∑
t′=0
c−(1−
d
2 )
t′αN ) ≥ 1−
t−1∑
t′=0
c−(1−
d
2 )
t′αN .
Notice that we need the condition (1− d2 )t−1αN ≥ F (N, d) to apply Equation (10). 
Now, by applying Claim 4.14 for a suitable choice of t, we finish the proof of phase 1. Let us define
T := dlog(1− d2 )
F (N, d)
αN
e.
We have that (1− d2 )T−1αN ≥ F (N, d) because
(1− d
2
)T−1 ≥ (1− d
2
)
log
(1− d
2
)
F (N,d)
αN =
F (N, d)
αN
. (11)
Thus by Claim 4.14, given N0 ≤ αN , we have
NT ≤ (1− d
2
)TαN ≤ F (N, d)
with probability at least
1−
T−1∑
t′=0
c−(1−
d
2 )
t′αN .
We show that this probability is equal to 1− o(1) and T = O(logN). Therefore, there will exist at most
F (N, d) = log 1
d
log logN Believers a.a.s. after O(logN) rounds.
Since (1− d2 ) = ( 22−d )−1,
T = dlog(1− d2 )
F (N, d)
αN
e = dlog 2
2−d
αN
F (N, d)
e ≤ dlog 2
2−d
Ne = O(logN).
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It remains to show that
∑T−1
t′=0 c
−(1− d2 )t
′
αN = o(1). We have
T−1∑
t′=0
c−(1−
d
2 )
t′αN ≤
T−1∑
t′=0
1
(1− d2 )t′αN
=
1
(1− d2 )T−1αN
T−1∑
t′=0
1
(1− d2 )t′−(T−1)
Eq. (11)
≤
1
F (N, d)
T−1∑
t′=0
(1− d
2
)t
′ ≤ 1
F (N, d)
∞∑
t′=0
(1− d
2
)t
′
=
2
F (N, d)d
= o(1).
In the second-to-last step we used that the geometric series
∑∞
t′=0(1− d2 )t
′
is equal to 11−(1−d/2) =
2
d .
Phase 2. So far we proved that if N0 ≤ αN , then Nt1 ≤ F (N, d) = log 1d log logN a.a.s. for some
t1 = O(logN). In this phase, we show that from a state with at most F (N, d) Believers, there is no
Believer, except Seeds, in a logarithmic number of rounds a.a.s.
Let us first prove Claim 4.15, which asserts if in some state the number of Believers is at most F (N, d),
their number does not overpass F (N, d) a.a.s. during the next logN rounds.
Claim 4.15 Given Nt1 ≤ F (N, d), we have Nt1+t ≤ F (N, d) for 1 ≤ t ≤ logN a.a.s.
Proof. Let us define for 0 ≤ t ≤ logN the event Bt := {Nt1+t ≤ F (N, d)}. We want to prove that
Pr[
∧logN
t=1 Bt|B0] = 1− o(1). We have
Pr[
logN∧
t=1
Bt|B0] =
logN∏
t=1
Pr[Bt|
t−1∧
t′=0
Bt′ ]
where the right-hand side is a telescoping product. We prove that
Pr[Bt|
t−1∧
t′=0
Bt′ ] ≥ 1− 1√
N
. (12)
Therefore,
Pr[
logN∧
t=1
Bt|B0] ≥ (1− 1√
N
)logN ≥ 1− logN√
N
= 1− o(1).
It remains to prove that Equation (12) holds. Let Bt be the complement of Bt. We claim that
Pr[Bt|Nt1+t−1 ≤ F (N, d)] ≤
N
r
(
F (N,d)
2
)(
r
2
)
(N − 2)!
N !
.
Given Nt1+t−1 ≤ F (N, d), for event Bt to happen (i.e., Nt1+t > F (N, d)), at least two Believers must
share a room in round t1 + t, to generate a new Believer. The numerator is an upper bound on the
number of permutations in which at least two Believers share a room, from all N ! possible permutations.
There are N/r possibilities to select a room and at most
(
F (N,d)
2
)
possibilities to choose two Believers.
There are
(
r
2
)
ways to place the two Believers in the room and (N−2)! possibilities to place the remaining
N − 2 agents. We count each permutation with at least two Believers in a room at least once in this way.
We might actually count a permutation several times, but it does not matter since we are interested in
an upper bound.
Simplifying the right-hand side gives us
Pr[Bt|Nt+t1−1 ≤ F (N, d)] ≤
F (N, d)2r
N − 1
which is smaller than 1√
N
since F (N, d) = log 1
d
log logN . Thus, we get Pr[Bt|Nt+t1−1 ≤ F (N, d)] ≥
1− 1√
N
. By applying the definition of Bt, we have
Pr[Bt|
t−1∧
t′=0
Bt′ ] ≥ Pr[Bt|Nt+t1−1 ≤ F (N, d)] ≥ 1−
1√
N
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which finishes the proof. 
By Claim 4.15, given Nt1 ≤ F (N, d), we have a.a.s. Nt1+t ≤ F (N, d) for 1 ≤ t ≤ logN , that is, for
logN rounds the number of Believers will not exceed F (N, d). Furthermore, in each round a Believer
becomes Indifferent independently with probability d, except Seeds. Thus, in each of these logN rounds
the probability that all Believers in that round (whose number is at most F (N, d)) become Indifferents
is at least
d
log 1
d
log logN
=
1
log logN
.
The probability that this does not occur in any of these logN rounds is upper-bounded by
(1− 1
log logN
)logN ≤ exp(− logN
log logN
) = o(1)
where we used 1−x ≤ exp(−x). Thus, a.a.s. after at most t1 + logN = O(logN) rounds, the rumor dies
out.
Tightness. We claim that the upper bound of O(logN) is tight. That is, if the process starts with αN
Believers, it takes the rumor at least a logarithmic number of rounds to die out. Assume that N0 = αN
and no new Believer is generated during the process, i.e., no Indifferent becomes a Believer. Even under
this assumption, in each round in expectation a d fraction of the Believers will become Indifferents. Thus
in expectation, it takes the process logarithmically many rounds to reach the state where all agents are
Indifferents, except Seeds. To turn this argument into an a.a.s. statement, we can apply Chernoff bound
(see Theorem 4.3). Assume Xnt denote the number of Believers who become Indifferent in the t-th round,
given Nt−1 = n. Since each Believer becomes Indifferent independently with probability d, except s
Seeds, then E[Xnt ] = (n− s)d ≤ nd. Thus, for a small constant  > 0 we have
Pr[(1 + )nd ≤ Xnt ] ≤ Pr[(1 + )E[Xnt ] ≤ Xnt ] ≤ exp(−Θ(n)).
Thus, if there are n = ω(1) Believers in round t − 1, a.a.s. in round t at most (1 + )d fraction of them
will become Indifferents. Now, applying an inductive argument similar to the one from Claim 4.14, it is
easy to show that starting from N0 = αN , a.a.s. it takes the rumor Ω(logN) rounds to die out.
5 Illustrations of the model
As we discussed, for the purpose of the present paper it is realistic to assume that parameters b and d
are relatively small constants, say b ≤ 0.25 and d ≤ 0.1. Furthermore, since the behavior of the process
is a function of several parameters, it is sensible to fix some parameters to study the impact of the others
in a more transparent set up. The range that the value of a fixed parameter is chosen from can be set
according to the potential application of the model.
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to study the m-rumor spreading model for larger values of d and
b in future work. In this section, we try to illustrate the behavior of the process in this setting building
on some approximate arguments. However, the rigorous analysis is left for future work.
We first introduce some notations. Let the density of Believers be the ratio of the number of Believers
to N . Furthermore, let f(P ) denote the expected number of Believers in the next round by assuming
that the density of Believers in the current round is equal to P , i.e., there are PN Believers.
Let us first consider the case of m = 1 and r = 2. Note that each Believer becomes Indifferent
independently with probability d. Thus in expectation a d fraction of Believers will become Indifferents.
(Actually, there are s Seeds who remain Believers regardless of the choice of d. However, since s is a small
constant, this can be ignored for our rough argument here.) Furthermore, Others who are Indifferents
constitute a (1 − b − P ) fraction of the community. Each of them shares its room with a Believer, and
consequently will become a Believer, with probability P . Therefore, we can “approximate” the value of
f(P ) to be
f(P ) = (1− d)P + (1− b− P )P.
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Function f(P ) has a unique fixed point 1 − b − d for P ∈ (0, 1 − b). More accurately, f(P ) < P for
P ∈ (0, 1 − b − d) and P < f(P ) for P ∈ (1 − b − d, 1 − b). See Figure 4 (left). Therefore, we expect
the process to converge to a state with Believer density almost 1− b− d. It is easy to check that this is
consistent with our results in Theorem 4.1 part (i), which holds for b ≤ 0.25 and d ≤ 0.1.
Figure 4: (left) function f(P ) has a unique fixed point for P ∈ (0, 1− b) (right) function f(P ) has two
fixed points P1 and P2 for P ∈ (0, 1− b).
Now, we consider the case of m = 2 and r = 3. Note that each Believer becomes Indifferent with prob-
ability d. (We are again skipping Seeds) Furthermore, an Other who is Indifferent will become Believer
if it shares its room with two Believers. Thus, by an argument similar to above, we can “approximate”
f(P ) to be
f(P ) = (1− d)P + (1− b− P )P 2.
(This is just an approximation since we assume that each seat is occupied by a Believer with probability
P independently, which is not true.)
Function f(P ) in this setting has two fixed points for P ∈ (0, 1 − b). More precisely, f(P ) < P for
P ∈ (0, P1), f(P ) > P for P ∈ (P1, P2) and f(P ) < P for P ∈ (P2, 1− b), where
P1 =
(1− b) +√(1− b)2 − 4d
2
, P2 =
(1− b) +√(1− b)2 − 4d
2
.
Therefore, if the initial density of Believers is less than P1, we expect the rumor to die out. However, if
the initial density is larger than P1, we expect the process to converge to a state with Believer density of
almost P2. See Figure 4 (right).
6 Conclusion
We have shown that within the m-rumor spreading model, switching from m = 1 to m ≥ 2 triggers a
drastic qualitative change in the spreading process. More precisely, when m = 1 even a small group of
Believers manage to convince a large part of the community very quickly, but form ≥ 2 even a substantial
fraction of Believers may not prevent the rumor from dying out after a few update rounds. Our results
shed a light on why a given rumor spreads within a social group and not in another as noted in Section 2.5
regarding some recent real cases of rumor spreading.
At this stage it is worth stressing that our model like other models, is not the reality. However, the
common aim is to grasp some essential traits of the reality despite making crude approximations. We
hope our findings shed some additional light on the understanding of rumor spreading phenomena.
Acknowledgment. The first author is thankful to Bernd Gärtner for several stimulating conversations
on a primary variant of the model.
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